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Abstract 
 
 
We characterize the sharing rule for which a contribution mechanism achieves efficiency in 
a cooperative production setting when agents are heterogeneous. The sharing rule bears no 
resemblance to those considered by the previous literature. We also show for a large class 
of sharing rules that if Nash equilibrium yields efficient allocations, the production function 
displays constant returns to scale, a case in which cooperation in production is useless. 
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1. Introduction
The Cooperative Production problem arises when n agents use a commonly owned tech-
nology to transform inputs into outputs. Output is distributed by means of a sharing
rule, a function yielding consumption of each agent as a function of inputs. In "classical"
economies there are allocations that are e¢ cient and belong to any given continuous
sharing rule (Corchón and Puy (2002), Proposition 1). Also, there is a mechanism that
implements these allocations in Nash equilibrium (Corchón and Puy (2002), Proposition
2, Nandeibam (2003)). The implementing mechanism, however, is complicated so in this
note we examine the performance of a natural mechanism in which each agent decides
her own input contribution and receives the consumption dictated by the sharing rule.
Holmstrom (1982) and Fabella (1988) showed in two special cases that such a mecha-
nism does not yield e¢ cient allocations as Nash Equilibria.1 Sen (1966) showed that a
particular mix of the egalitarian and the proportional sharing rules achieves e¢ ciency
when all agents are identical. However, when agents are heterogeneous, Browning (1983)
showed that the natural mechanism described above achieves e¢ ciency only when the
production function fullls a separability property. A result from Gradstein (1995) can
be generalized to our framework to show that the natural mechanism achieves e¢ ciency
only when the production function is a polynomial of, at most, degree n  1.
In this paper we delve into the kind of sharing rules for which the natural mech-
anism achieves e¢ ciency when the domain of admissible preferences is large enough.
We rst characterize the sharing rule for which the natural mechanism yields e¢ cient
allocations (Proposition 1 and Remark 1). We call this rule the Incremental Sharing
Rule. We show that the incremental sharing rule yields non negative returns in two
cases: when the production function is a polynomial with all coe¢ cients but one are
1Both assume utility functions quasi-linear in consumption. Holmstrom considers only sharing rules
which depend on aggregate output and Fabella considers only the proportional sharing rule.
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negative (Proposition 2) or when all coe¢ cients but two are positive (Proposition 3).
Unfortunately, we have been unable to guarantee non negativity in general. Dene
the incremental consumption of an agent as the di¤erence between the consumption
when this agent works and the consumption when he does not work. We show that
the incremental consumption yielded by the incremental sharing rule is bounded by the
incremental consumption yielded by the proportional and the egalitarian sharing rules
(Proposition 4). Finally, we show for a class of sharing rules, which to the best of our
knowledge, includes all of those used by the literature, that if Nash equilibrium yields
e¢ cient allocations, the production function displays constant returns to scale, a case
in which cooperation in production is useless (Proposition 5). Thus, implementation of
sharing rules in this class requires a di¤erent mechanism from the one considered here,
possibly, a complex one. This implies that Sen´s result is an artifact of his assumption
that agents are identical.
2. The Model and the Results
We have n agents that supply labor denoted by li, i 2 N = f1; 2; ::::ng. Let l 
(l1; l2; :::; ln); l i  (l1; :::; li 1; li+1; :::; ln); ` 
Pn
j=1 lj , ` i 
P
j 6=i lj , ` ik =
P
j 6=i;j 6=k lj ;
and so on. There is a maximum quantity of labor that any agent can supply, l.
Agents share a technology that is able to generate a consumption good whose pro-
duction function is written as X(`): It is assumed to be concave, increasing and di¤er-
entiable in [0; nl] with X(0) = 0: The production function displays Constant Returns
to Scale if X(`) = a`, a > 0.
Let xi be the consumption of i and x  (x1; x2; :::; xn). The pair (x; l) is an allocation.
An allocation (x; l) is feasible if
Pn
i=1 xi = X(`) and 0  li  l; i 2 N . The set of feasible
allocations is denoted by A.
Each agent, say i, has preferences over consumption and labor representable by
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a strictly concave and di¤erentiable utility function Ui = Ui(xi; li) which is strictly
increasing (resp. decreasing) in the rst (second) argument.
E¢ cient allocations are found by
max
nX
i=1
iUi(xi; li) with (x; l) 2 A (2.1)
for given (1; 2; :::; n) with i  0 and
Pn
i=1 i = 1. This is the maximization of a
continuous function over a compact set and, hence, it has a solution by Weierestrass
theorem. The program is concave and thus rst order conditions gives the maximum.
Assuming interiority, we have that
@Ui
@xi
dX
d`
+
@Ui
@li
= 0; i 2 N . (2.2)
A Sharing Rule species the consumption allocated to each agent as a function of labor
inputs. Formally, a sharing rule, x(); is a collection of functions (x1(); x2(); ::::; xn())
with xi : <n+ ! <+, i 2 N; such that
Pn
j=1 xj(l) = X(`), 8l 2 [0; l]n. Two well-known
examples of sharing rules are:
xPi (l) =
liPn
j=1 lj
X(`); for all i 2 N (Proportional)
xEi (l) =
1
n
X(`); for all i 2 N (Equal Sharing)
Consider now the non-cooperative part of the problem. If labor contributions are
voluntary the strategy space for each agent is [0; l]. Let x(l) = (x1(l); x2(l); :::; xn(l)).
Thus, the payo¤ functions are Ui(xi(l); li); i 2 N: A Nash equilibrium of this mechanism
is a vector of strategies (l) such that
Ui(xi(l
); li )  Ui(xi(l1; ::; li; ::; ln); li) for all li 2 [0; ,l]; for each agent i:
We will speak of a Nash equilibrium associated to a sharing rule, since the latter enters
into the payo¤ functions. The rst order conditions of an interior Nash equilibrium are
@Ui
@xi
@xi
@li
+
@Ui
@li
= 0: (2.3)
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We will consider that the sharing rule and the technology are xed but preferences
are not: An economy, denoted by U  (Ui( ); Ui( ); ::::; Ui( )), is a list of utility functions.
The set of e¢ cient allocations in U is denoted by 'E(U). The input vector (l) is e¢ cient
in U if (x(l); l) 2 'E(U). Let E be the set of all admissible economies. Dene,
R = f(l j 9U 2 E ; (x(l); l) 2 'E(U)g:
In words, R is the set of input allocations that are e¢ cient for some economy. Dene,
Ri(l i) = fli j 9U 2 E ; (x(li; l i); (li; l i) 2 'E(U)g:
In words, Ri(l i) is the set of input contributions for i, li; such that (li; l i) is an e¢ cient
input allocation for some economy.
We assume that the set of admissible economies is large in the following sense:
E is such that Ri(l i) is the interval (0; l), 8i 2 N: (LD)
It is easy to generate a space of economies for which (LD) holds. For instance let
Ui = xi   il2i =2: In order to have allocation (x(l^); l^) as e¢ cient, choose s such that
dX(^`)
d`
= i l^i: (2.4)
Since the second order conditions of (2.1) hold, the allocation above is e¢ cient.
We adapt a result from Gradstein (1995) in the framework of the Cournot oligopoly
model (a special case of the model considered in this paper) that we use as a Lemma.
Lemma 1. If Nash equilibrium yields e¢ cient and interior allocations in any U 2 E,
the production function is a polynomial of, at most, degree (n  1):
Proof. Take any U 2 E and consider a Pareto e¢ cient allocation (x(l); l) such that
l is a Nash equilibrium. Thus, from (2.2) and (2.3),
@xi(l
)
@li
=
dX(
Pn
j=1 l

j )
d`
; 8i 2 N . (2.5)
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The above equation holds in the interval Ri(l i): Integrating on (0; li) we get
xi(li; l

 i) = X(li +
X
j 6=i
lj ) Qi, 8li 2 Ri(l i); 8i 2 N , (2.6)
where Qi depends on l i: Since the above equation holds for all lj 2 Rj(l j); 8j 6= i;
xi(l)  X(
nX
j=1
lj) Qi(l i); 8(li; l i) 2 R; 8i 2 N . (2.7)
Adding over i and considering feasibility we obtain
(n  1)X(
nX
j=1
lj) 
nX
j=1
Qj(l j); 8l 2 R: (2.8)
(see Browning (1983)). Consider now all the possible vectors with one component
equal to zero. For each of these vectors we apply equation (2.8) and we subtract the
resulting equations from equation (2.8). We do the same for all possible vectors with
two components equal to zero and we add the equations to the result of the previous
step. We proceed in this way subtracting from the previous step the equation resulting
from considering all possible vectors with an odd number of components equal to zero
and adding the equations resulting from considering all possible vectors with an even
number of components equal to zero. As a result of these operations we get the following
functional equation:
X(`) 
nX
k=1
X(` k) +
X
(k;t)=k<t
X(` kt) + ::::::+ ( 1)n 1
nX
j=1
X(lj) = 0: (2.9)
The solution of (2.9) is a polynomial of, at most, degree (n   1) (Aczel (1966) pp.
129-130).
An implication of the previous lemma is that when n = 2 and the production function
is strictly concave, Nash equilibrium cannot be e¢ cient in all economies in E . We now
characterize the sharing rules whose Nash equilibria are e¢ cient:
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Proposition 1. If all Nash equilibria associated with an anonymous sharing rule are
e¢ cient, the sharing rule has the form:
xIi (l) = X(`)  (n  1)X(` i) +
n  1
2
X
k 6=i
X(` ik) + ::::+ ( 1)n 1
X
j 6=i
X(lj): (2.10)
Proof. Given l; for each agent i; we can nd Qi(l i) applying equation (2.8) succes-
sively to X(` i); X(` ik) for all possible k di¤erent from i; X(` ikh) for all possible k
and h ; k < h; di¤erent from i; and so on up to X(lj) for all possible j di¤erent from i:
Given the equations obtained in this way, we apply the following operation:
(n  1)X(` i)  n  1
2
X
k 6=i
X(` ik)  ::::  ( 1)n 1n  1
n  1
X
j 6=i
X(lj): (2.11)
By anonymity we know that for any vector such that l i = l j ; Qi(l i) = Qj(l j):
Thus, applying anonymity to the result of the above operation we get that:
Qi(l i) = (n  1)X(` i)  n  1
2
X
k 6=i
X(` ik) + ::::  ( 1)n 1
X
j 6=i
X(lj); (2.12)
as we wanted to prove.
When n = 3 and n = 4 the sharing rule (2.10) looks as follows:
xIi (l) = X(`)  2X(` i) +
X
j 6=i
X(lj); and (2.13)
xIi (l) = X(`)  3X(` i) +
3
2
X
k 6=i
X(` ik) 
X
j 6=i
X(lj): (2.14)
The sharing rule (2.10) awards each agent the whole output minus a measure of the
contributions of others. We will call it the Incremental Sharing Rule because it comes
from equation (2.7) which implies that
xIi (l)  xIi (l i) = X(`) X(` i): (2.15)
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Thus, the incremental sharing rule, despite the complex analytical form is really simple.
It demands the equalization between private gain in consumption of i and public gain
in aggregate output for each variation of the labor supplied by i.2
The existence of a Nash equilibrium associated with the incremental sharing rule is
proved by noting that, under the conditions stated below, the second derivative of i´s
payo¤ function with respect to i´s labor is negative. Thus payo¤s are concave and a
standard xed point argument shows the existence of a Nash equilibrium. Formally,
Remark 1. If the production function is a polynomial of, at most, degree n   1 and
@2Ui
@xili
 0 for all i there is a Nash equilibrium associated to the sharing rule (2.10).3
Unfortunately we have not been able to prove that, in general, the incremental
sharing rule yields non negative returns. Clearly, it yields non negative returns when
n = 2; since in this case the production is lineal. When n > 2 we only have a partial
result stated in the next propositions.
Proposition 2. Let n  3; and let X(`) = an 1`n 1 + an 2`n 2 + :::::+ a2`2 + a1` an
increasing and concave polynomial in [0; nl] with at  0 for all t 2 f2; :::; n  1g: Then,
xIi (l)  0 for all i:
Proof. Since xIi (l) is increasing in li (recall that x
I
i (l) = X(`)   Qi(l i)), to prove
the proposition it is enough to show that xIi (l i)  0: Without lost of generality let us
consider i = n: From (2.10) we know that
xIn(l n) =  (n  2)X(` n) +
n  1
2
n 1X
k=1
X(` nk) + ::::+ ( 1)n 1
n 1X
j=1
X(lj): (2.16)
2 In a model of cost-sharing Moulin (2006) characterizes the (polynomial) cost function whose Nash
equilibria are e¢ cient when utility functions are quasi-linear. Despite the similarity in the techniques
used by Moulin and us, none of the results imply the other since the inverse of a polynomial is not a
polynomial. Moreover cost-sharing and surplus sharing problems are not equivalent (see Leroux (2005)).
3Existence results in the literature assume quasi-linear utility in labor (Holmstrom (1982), Fabella
(1988) and Moulin (2006)). In this case @
2Ui
@2xili
= 0.
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Let Xt(`) = at`t; 1  t  n  1; and let us show that for all t 2 f1; ::; n  1g;
 (n  2)Xt(` n) + n  1
2
n 1X
k=1
Xt(` nk) + ::::+ ( 1)n 1
n 1X
j=1
Xt(lj)  0: (2.17)
Notice rst that, for a given set of m components, 1  m  n   1, without loss of
generality, let us call them l1; :::; lm,
Xt(l1 + ::+ lm) = at
X
t1;::;tm
t!
t1!:::tm!
lt11 l
t2
2 :::l
tm
m , (2.18)
where the sum is taken over all non negative integers t1; ::; tm such that t1+ :::+ tm = t:
Thus, expression (2.17) can be rewritten as an expression with terms of the form
lt11 l
t2
2 :::l
tm
m with 1  m  t, th > 0 for all h 2 f1; :::;mg and t1 + ::: + tm = t: Let
us see that all the coe¢ cients of such terms are positive. Fix m; and t1; :::; tm all
positive and such that t1 + ::: + tm = t: For each of the terms involving the sum of
k components (k  m) in expression (2.17), lt11 lt22 :::ltmm appears as many times as the
number of combinations of (n  m   1) elements taken (k  m) at a time. Thus, the
coe¢ cient of lt11 l
t2
2 :::l
tm
m is:
at
t!
t1!:::tm!
"
 (n  2) +
n 2X
k=m
( 1)n k (n  1)
(n  k)

n m  1
k  m
#
: (2.19)
We prove in the Appendix (Lemma 2) that
 (n  2) +
n 2X
k=m
( 1)n k (n  1)
n  k

n m  1
k  m

=
 m+ 1
n m : (2.20)
Since at  0 for all t 2 f2; :::; n 1g the coe¢ cient of lt11 lt22 :::ltmm is non negative. Therefore
expression (2.17) is non negative for all t 2 f2; ::; n   1g: For t = 1; a1 is positive and
su¢ ciently large to guarantee that the polynomial is increasing, but in this case we only
have terms of the form tj , and all the coe¢ cients of these terms are zero (since m = 1).
Thus, expression (2.17) is non negative for all t as we wanted to prove.
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Proposition 3. Let n  4; and let X(`) = an 1`n 1 + an 2`n 2 + :::::+ a2`2 + a1` an
increasing and concave polynomial in [0; nl] with at  0 for all t 2 f3; :::; n  1g: Then,
xIi (l)  0 for all i:
Proof. Notice rst that the proof of Proposition 2 can be reproduced here up to (2.20).
From expressions (2.19), and (2.20) we know that for a given t; 1  t  n   1; for a
xed m, 1  m  t; and for t1; :::; tm all positive and such that t1 + ::: + tm = t, the
coe¢ cient of terms of the form lt11 l
t2
2 :::l
tm
m is given by
at
t!
t1!:::tm!
(
 m+ 1
n m ): (2.21)
For m = 1; the coe¢ cient is zero. So we just x attention to m  2: For t = 2; we
only have terms of the form ljlk with coe¢ cient   2(n 2)a2: Thus, expression (2.17) is
non positive for all t 2 f3; ::; n   1g since at  0; it is positive for t = 2 since a2 < 0;
and it is cero for t = 1: However, let us see that (2.16) is positive. By concavity of the
polynomial,
2a2   
n 1X
t=3
t(t  1)at`t 2 for all ` 2 [0; nl]: (2.22)
In particular, (2.22) holds for ` = nn 1(
Pn 1
j=1 lj): Thus, for all possible combinations of
ljlk:
  2
(n  2)a2ljlk 
1
(n  2)
n 1X
t=3
t(t  1)at( n
n  1)
t 2ljlk(
n 1X
j=1
lj)
t 2; (2.23)
For a given t; 3  t  n   1; for a xed m, 2  m  t; and for t1; :::; tm all positive
and such that t1 + ::: + tm = t, the term l
t1
1 l
t2
2 :::l
tm
m appears in all the inequalities in
(2.23) involving all possible order pairs ljlk among (l1; :::; lm): Thus, the coe¢ cient of
lt11 l
t2
2 :::l
tm
m that is obtained from those inequalities is:X
Tmjk
1
(n  2)(
n
n  1)
t 2t(t  1)at (t  2)!
t1!::(tj   1)!::(tk   1)!:::tm! ; (2.24)
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where the sum is taken over all possible pairs of indexes in the set Tmjk = f(j; k)=j < k;
and j; k 2 f1; :::;mgg: Notice that expression (2.24) can be rewritten as:X
Tmjk
1
(n  2)(
n
n  1)
t 2at
t!tjtk
t1!::tj !::tk!:::tm!
: (2.25)
Since tjtk  1; and the cardinality of the set Tmjk is equal to the combinations of m
elements taken two at a time, expression (2.25) is bigger than
1
(n  2)(
n
n  1)
t 2at
t!
t1!::tj !::tk!:::tm!
m(m  1)
2
: (2.26)
Thus, combining (2.21) and (2.26), we get that the coe¢ cient of lt11 l
t2
2 :::l
tm
m is
at
t!
t1!:::tm!
 m+ 1
n m +
1
(n  2)(
n
n  1)
t 2m(m  1)
2

: (2.27)
We show in the Appendix (Lemma 3) that (2.27) is positive for all m; 2  m  t;
3  t  n  1; which implies that (2.16) is positive as we wanted to prove.
Next we focus on the properties of the incremental sharing rule.
The consumption yielded by Sen´ sharing rule is between those yielded by the pro-
portional and the egalitarian sharing rules. This property does not hold for the incre-
mental sharing rule, as shown by the following example:
Example 1. Let n = 3. Thus xI1(l1; l2; l3) = X(l1+l2+l3) 2X(l2+l3)+X(l2)+X(l3):
When 2l1 = l2 + l3 the consumption for agent 1 yielded by the proportional and the
egalitarian sharing rule coincide. Thus, if the consumption for agent 1 yielded by the
incremental rule were in between those yielded by the proportional and the egalitarian,
the three must coincide. Thus,
xI1(
l2 + l3
2
; l2; l3) = X(3
l2 + l3
2
)  2X(l2 + l3) +X(l2) +X(l3) =
X(3 l2+l32 )
3
which implies
2
3
X(3
l2 + l3
2
) = 2X(l2 + l3) X(l2) X(l3)
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Taking l2 = 0; the previous equation yields
2
3
X(3
l3
2
) = 2X(l3) X(l3) = X(l3)
which only is true under constant returns to scale.
However a related property holds for this sharing rule. The increase in consumption
resulting from a increase in i´s labor in the incremental sharing rule (2.10) is between
those yielded by the proportional and the egalitarian sharing rules.
Proposition 4. xEi (l)  xEi (l i)  xIi (l)  xIi (l i)  xPi (l)  xPi (l i):
Proof. For the sharing rule (2.10), it holds that
xIi (l)  xIi (l i) = X(`) X(` i):
For the egalitarian sharing rule,
xEi (l)  xEi (l i) =
1
n
(X(`) X(` i)):
Thus,
xEi (l)  xEi (l i)  xIi (l)  xIi (l i):
For the relation of sharing rule (2.10) with the Proportional, notice that since X() is
concave with X(0) = 0, X(`)=` is decreasing. Thus,
X(` i)
` i
 X(`)
`
; ) X(` i)  X(`)  li
`
X(`):
Thus,
xPi (l)  xPi (l i) =
li
`
X(`)  X(`) X(` i) = xIi (l)  xIi (l i);
as we wanted to prove.
Given the novelty of the form of (2.10), we investigate the implications of postulating
sharing rules like those considered by the literature (see, e.g. Moulin (1987), Pngsten
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(1991) and Roemer and Silvestre (1993)). The next proposition characterizes the tech-
nology for which Nash equilibrium yields e¢ cient allocations for a class of sharing rules
that, to the best of our knowledge, contains all sharing rules proposed by the literature.
Proposition 5. Assume that the sharing rule can be written as xi = xi(li;
Pn
j=1 lj); or
it is such that xi(0; l i) = 0: If Nash equilibrium yields e¢ cient and interior allocations
in any U 2 E , the production function displays constant returns to scale.
Proof. Case 1. Let us consider rst the case xi = xi(li;
Pn
j=1 lj): Since the production
function depends on the sum of inputs; Qi(l i) = Qi(
P
j 6=i lj): For any possible vector l
such that
Pn
j=1 lj  l; consider another vector such that all components are zero except
one (let us say i) and this component is the sum of all components in l: Then, equation
(2.8) implies that:
(n  1)X(`) =
X
j 6=i
Qj(`): (2.28)
Repeating the argument but considering that the non-zero component is k,
(n  1)X(`) =
X
j 6=k
Qj(`): (2.29)
Subtracting both equations we get that
Qi(`) = Qk(`): (2.30)
Since the above equation is true for any i and k, from (2.28),
(n  1)X(`) = (n  1)Qk(`); (2.31)
which implies Qk(`) = X(`) for all k and `. Given l such that
Pn
j=1 lj  l; consider
another vector with the rst component equal to l1, the second component equal toP
j 6=1 lj and any other component equal to zero. Equation (2.8) now reads
(n  1)X(
nX
j=1
lj) = X(
X
j 6=1
lj) +X(l1) + (n  2)X(
nX
j=1
lj); (2.32)
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which implies that
X(
nX
j=1
lj) = X(
X
j 6=1
lj) +X(l1): (2.33)
Repeating the argument to X(
P
j 6=1 lj) and so on, we get that
X(
nX
j=1
lj) =
nX
j=1
X(lj); for all l such that
nX
j=1
lj  l: (2.34)
This is a Cauchy equation whose solutions are linear (Aczel (1966), chapter 2). Thus,
the production function displays constant returns to scale for all l such that
Pn
j=1 lj  l.
By Lemma 1 the production function is a polynomial of degree n  1: Combining both
results, the production function displays constant returns to scale in the whole domain.
Case 2. If the sharing rule is such that xi(0; l i) = 0; we have that xi(l i) = 0 =
X(` i) Qi(l i): Thus, Qi(l i) = X(` i) for all i and (2.8) reads:
(n  1)X(
nX
j=1
lj) 
nX
j=1
X(` j): (2.35)
Let us see that equation (2.35) implies that
X(
nX
j=1
lj) =
nX
j=1
X(lj); (2.36)
which is a Cauchys equation whose solutions are linear (see Aczel 1966, chapter 2 for a
discussion). We prove the above relation by induction on the number of zero components
in a vector l: Let us consider a vector l such that all components but two are zero. Thus,
(n  1)X(li + lj) = X(li) +X(lj) + (n  2)X(li + lj); thus
X(li + lj) = X(li) +X(lj):
Suppose that the relation is true for all vectors l such that all components but one are
di¤erent from zero. Then, applying the induction hypothesis to equation (2.35),
(n  1)X(
nX
j=1
lj) =
nX
j=1
X(l j) = (n  1)
nX
j=1
X(lj);
14
as we wanted to prove.
Proposition 5 implies that the result obtained by Sen is an artifact of his assumption
that all agents are identical. In his case our assumption LD fails because Ri(l i) is just
a point or the empty set.
3. Appendix
Lemma 2. Let
Sn =  (n  2) +
n 2X
k=m
( 1)n k (n  1)
n  k

n m  1
k  m

:
Then, Sn =  m+1n m :
Proof. Notice rst that
1
n  k

n m  1
k  m

=
1
n m

n m
n  k

; and
n 2X
k=m
( 1)n k

n m
n  k

=
n mX
k=2
( 1)k

n m
k

:
Thus,
Sn =  (n  2) + (n  1)
(n m)
n mX
k=2
( 1)k

n m
k

:
By the Newtons binomial we know that
0 = (1 + ( 1))n m =
n mX
k=0
( 1)k

n m
k

:
Thus,
Sn =  (n  2) + (n  1)
(n m)( 1 + n m) =
 m+ 1
n m ;
as we wanted to prove.
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Lemma 3. For all t; 3  t  n  1; and for all m; 2  m  n  1;
 m+ 1
n m +
1
(n  2)(
n
n  1)
t 2m(m  1)
2
 0: (3.1)
Proof. Notice rst that in order to prove the statement it is enough to show that for
all m; 2  m  t;
 1 + 1
(n  2)(
n
n  1)
t 2m(n m)
2
 0: (3.2)
Clearly, for m = 2; the statement is true. Notice that m(n   m) as a function of m
extended to the real numbers is concave in m;thus, the minimum of this function is
reached in m = 2 or m = t: Notice that m(n  m) gets the same value for m = 2 and
for m = n   2: Therefore, if t  n   2; for all 2  m  t; m(n  m)  2(n   2): Thus,
the expression in (3.2) is positive. If t = n  1; the minimum is obtained in m = t: Let
us show that also in this case the statement of the Lemma holds, that is:
 1 + 1
(n  2)(
n
n  1)
n 3 (n  1)
2
 0; or equivalently, (3.3)
(n  1)
(n  2)(
n
n  1)
n 3  2: (3.4)
Let an =
(n 1)
(n 2)(
n
n 1)
n 3 , bn =
(n 1)
(n 2)
 
n 1
n
2
and cn = ( nn 1)
n 1 . Notice that an = bncn:
The sequence cn is a well studied sequence which is increasing and converges to the
number e; and it is easy to prove that the sequence bn is increasing in n for all n  4:
Thus, an is increasing in n and since a4 = 2; an  2 for all n  4:
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